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LAW, ETHICS, AND INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCE 
LEE C. BUCHHEIT* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border financial flows can have dramatic effects on the recipients of 
the money—for good or for ill. This is particularly true in countries whose 
economies and capital markets are underdeveloped. A relatively small inflow of 
foreign capital into such a country can inflate valuations on a local stock 
exchange or allow the government to distribute pre-election largesse in the 
form of subsidies, tax breaks, spending on public works projects, and so forth. A 
sudden outflow of that capital, however, can have disagreeable consequences of 
an equal and opposite magnitude. 
Ethical questions about who should receive cross-border financing, in what 
amounts, for what purposes, and on what conditions have long engaged the 
attention of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the regional development banks. There may 
even still be a few commercial lenders holding to the view that a private creditor 
should concern itself solely with the profitability of a transaction and the 
likelihood that the debt will be repaid, to the exclusion of all other ancillary 
issues, but these probably constitute a dwindling minority. Like it or not, loans 
that are susceptible to challenge on grounds of illegitimacy or recklessness run a 
higher risk of non-payment. So, whether viewed under the light of ethics–
morality or profit-loss, the issues cannot be avoided. 
What, if anything, does the law add to this discussion of ethics and 
international finance? The law and the machinery of justice are certainly 
ubiquitous elements in the lending process. After all, cross-border credits are 
invariably evidenced by contracts of one kind or another that contemplate 
enforcement in a national court. 
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Specifically, are the ethical considerations raised by cross-border loans 
exclusively matters to be taken into account before the credits are extended, or 
are they also relevant to the interpretation and enforcement of the legal 
agreements that eventually evidence the credits? 
II 
THE RULES 
Parties entering into a commercial contract want predictability in its 
interpretation and enforcement. The outcome produced by the application of 
the governing law in any particular dispute may be far less important to the 
parties than the fact that the outcome can be anticipated in advance of signing 
the contract. Why? Because if the predictable outcome is commercially 
unacceptable to one or both of the parties, they are free—before they have 
signed the agreement—to adjust its terms to avoid that result, to switch the 
chosen governing law if a switch solves the problem, or, as a final resort, to 
scrap the deal altogether. But what commercial parties find intolerable is the 
prospect of locking themselves into a contractual arrangement that may 
subsequently be interpreted or enforced in a manner inconsistent with their 
presigning intentions. 
The ability of a legal regime to deliver a predictable outcome is one of the 
major reasons why contractual counterparties will choose that regime as the 
governing law of their contract. This is particularly true in the context of 
financial transactions. Most lending arrangements involve starkly asymmetrical 
performance by the parties: the lender’s obligations are heavily front-loaded 
(they lend the money), while most of the borrower’s obligations are performed 
thereafter (they must pay the money back over time). In asymmetrical contracts 
of this type, the party that must perform first—here, the lender—has an 
especially keen interest in knowing that it can enforce the subsequent 
performance of its counterparty or obtain an award of fully compensatory 
damages if that performance is not forthcoming. 
Common-law legal systems, with the importance they attach to judicial 
precedents, have a natural advantage in this regard. The accumulated weight of 
those precedents both presage and constrain how the judiciary will interpret the 
provisions of commercial agreements. Judges in these systems are not free to 
reach wholly imaginative or idiosyncratic conclusions about what contractual 
provisions mean or how they should be enforced. 
III 
THE EMOLLIENTS 
But even in the strictest common-law systems, this goal of sharp 
predictability is padded at the edges to safeguard against results that would 
strike most people as unfair or unjust. Over the centuries, Anglo American 
jurisprudence has leavened the application of the rules governing the strict 
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enforcement of contracts with doctrines that permit judges to reach decisions 
comporting with their sense of fairness and equity in the circumstances of a 
particular case. Giving the judiciary this maneuvering room obviously injects a 
degree of subjectivity into the decisionmaking process. To put it bluntly, the 
more a legal system tolerates emollient doctrines of this kind in its contract law, 
the less confident parties can be that their agreement will be interpreted and 
enforced by Judge Jones in Courtroom 101 in precisely the same way as it 
would have been by Judge Brown in the adjoining Courtroom 102. This 
fundamental tension has long been visible in the development of Anglo 
American contract law. A strong desire for predictable interpretation and 
enforcement of commercial agreements has been balanced against a recognition 
that judges should not be forced by an unyielding set of rules to hand down 
judgments that are repugnant to a sense of fairness and justice. 
This tension propelled, for example, the growth of the courts of equity and 
equity jurisprudence in England during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
The common law as it then existed may have produced predictable results, but 
it was increasingly perceived as ossified, inadequate in the remedies that it 
offered injured litigants, and frequently unfair in its harshness and rigidity. The 
result? A parallel system of courts, the chancery courts, dispensing equitable 
relief in a more flexible manner, came into existence. As part of this equity 
jurisprudence, judges were free to entertain excuses for the non-performance of 
contracts under doctrines such as undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, 
mistake, impossibility or impracticability of performance, unclean hands, laches, 
and so forth. 
The ability of American judges to widen their peripheral vision in contract 
cases to take into account the circumstances surrounding a contract, and not 
just its black letter, was significantly boosted in the twentieth century by the 
recognition of doctrines such as “unconscionable” contracts and the “good faith 
and fair dealing” obligations imposed on all parties to a contract. These 
concepts are deliberately imprecise. But they invite judges to weigh factors in 
judicial decisionmaking that might, in other contexts, be described as ethical, 
moral, or equitable in nature. 
And finally there is the bankruptcy court—that place where any contract 
can be suspended, modified, or abrogated as necessary to give a debtor a shot at 
rehabilitation. Bankruptcy is thus the ultimate emollient. This too was a product 
of the twentieth century. The type of bankruptcy proceeding now referred to in 
the United States as Chapter 11 for corporate debtors was only introduced in 
the 1930s and has gradually been refined through several legislative 
amendments over the intervening years. 
IV 
WHAT MAKES INTERNATIONAL FINANCE DIFFERENT? 
If the development of contract law has gradually accommodated the 
introduction of features and institutions like bankruptcy that soften the 
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application of rigid interpretative rules and admit ethical and equitable 
considerations into the judicial decisionmaking process, why should cross-
border financial contracts be viewed any differently from purely domestic 
financial contracts? In other words, what justification can there be for 
expanding or reinterpreting the conventional emollients in a cross-border 
context? 
There are several reasons, among them the absence of a global bankruptcy 
regime, the convention that successor sovereigns assume the debts of their 
predecessors, and the restricted reach of judicial remedies. 
A. No Bankruptcy Regime 
First and foremost is the absence of anything resembling a Chapter 11 
rehabilitation process for sovereign debtors and, in many countries, a fair and 
workable bankruptcy procedure for corporate debtors. The significance of 
Chapter 11 (and its counterparts elsewhere) cannot be overstated in its 
influence upon the behavior of contractual counterparties. That significance 
goes far beyond just the cases that actually wind up in Chapter 11. 
The very existence of a Chapter 11 alternative—unpleasant as it is for both 
corporate debtors and their creditors—is a brooding shadow over all corporate 
debt workouts. It compels a degree of moderation, sobriety, and restraint on 
both sides. If either side comes to believe that its position in an out-of-court 
workout will be materially worse than its fate in a Chapter 11 proceeding, it will 
put the problem into the hands of the bankruptcy court. 
This moderating influence is frequently absent in cross-border financial 
disputes. Sovereign debtors completely lack this element of leverage over their 
creditors. There is no bankruptcy regime for a sovereign borrower. Sovereigns 
are uniquely vulnerable to hostile creditor legal actions; there is no possibility of 
an “automatic stay” of such actions, much less an involuntary “cram down” of a 
plan of reorganization. 
In the corporate context, the shoe is often on the other foot. A corporate 
debtor located in a jurisdiction that lacks a fair and functioning bankruptcy 
regime has more leverage over its creditors than does its U.S.-based 
counterpart. Putting a corporate debtor into involuntary bankruptcy in such a 
country is frequently so appalling a prospect for the creditor that any negotiated 
workout is preferable to the bankruptcy option. 
B. Public International Law 
Cross-border financial contracts can sometimes be affected by public 
international legal principles that have no correlatives in municipal law. The 
best example is the public international law doctrine of state or governmental 
succession to debt obligations incurred by prior regimes in the debtor country. 
It is a strict doctrine around which few emollient principles have ever coalesced. 
For example, interpreted strictly—and it usually is interpreted strictly—this 
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doctrine forces sovereign borrowers to assume the responsibility for debts 
incurred by former despots for their own personal use. 
C. Limited Scope of Judicial Remedies 
Private parties usually have little choice but to submit their cross-border 
financial contracts, even with sovereign borrowers, to the municipal laws and 
the municipal courts of one country or another. There is no truly international 
law of contracts and no transnational judicial body to adjudicate contract 
disputes. The remedies available to a judge sitting in such a municipal court, 
however, are limited and parochial. The cause of action is money due but not 
paid on a debt instrument. The remedy is typically an award of monetary 
damages. 
Even when the cause of the debtor’s default is a catastrophic collapse of the 
economy in the debtor country, sometimes resulting from natural disasters or 
shifts in international trading patterns, a municipal court will have little room to 
take these factors into account in handing down a judgment. Doctrines of 
impossibility or impracticability of performance, particularly in cases involving 
borrowed money, are interpreted very strictly. The circumstances giving rise to 
the defense must not have been foreseeable by the parties at the time they 
signed the deal. 
So we have a system in which the remedies available in municipal law for 
the breach of a cross-border debt contract, while perhaps adequate for a one-off 
situation, are wholly inadequate to deal with a generalized debt crisis in a 
foreign country. Municipal courts are typically forbidden from looking into the 
underlying causes of the default, nor are they competent to issue orders that can 
direct the behavior of both creditors and debtors toward a broader resolution of 
the crisis. That authority, in a domestic corporate context, would have been 
exercised by a bankruptcy court. It is like equipping a physician with an 
inexhaustible supply of three-inch bandages, and then sending her off to the 
scene of the crash of a commercial jet airplane. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The evolution of Anglo American contract law has thus been shaped by a 
desire for clear, predictable rules of contract interpretation and enforcement, 
on the one side, and a perceived need for emollient doctrines or institutions by 
which considerations of fairness, reasonableness, and equity are admitted into 
the judicial decisionmaking process, on the other. 
Whatever one’s views about whether this balance has been struck 
appropriately in a purely domestic context, debtor–creditor relationships in a 
cross-border setting are played out against a different factual and legal 
backdrop. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the balance should be 
reassessed in this different environment. 
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The articles in this volume analyze a difficult area where law and ethics have 
not yet found a happy coexistence—the problem of odious debts. The law 
requires successor governments to honor the obligations incurred by their 
predecessors, with very few exceptions. Morality and fairness, however, balk at 
the idea of forcing the citizens of a country to repay debts that may have only 
benefited a kleptomaniacal former dictator. The trick, of course, is finding a 
way to relax the strict legal rule to avoid the morally repugnant result, without 
abandoning altogether the principle that sovereign-debt contracts are intended 
to be legally binding undertakings. 
